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MURR V. WISCONSIN: A NECESSARY EVIL?
SHA’KERA TRIMBLE
I. Introduction: The Root of the Fifth Amendment
The right to acquire and possess property has long been established, and
since, reaffirmed, as a right fundamental to our society.1 In fact, during the
time leading up to our present Constitution, hundreds of amendments were
proposed.2 Of those, the Fifth Amendment, which included some indicia of
protection of private property, survived the cut3 and joined nine other
amendments that would come to be known collectively as the Bill of
Rights. A property owner naturally expects that he will be permitted to do
as he pleases with his own property. After all, few individuals purchase a
house with an expectation that someone else will dictate the color the fence
will be painted or expecting that someone can prevent them from
converting the home into a Bed and Breakfast.
Nevertheless, the rights and expectations associated with property
ownership constantly face opposition. Where property rights in general are
recognized and defined by the government, competing interests between
state and local governments and property owners continue to produce
 J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A. 2015, Texas
Tech University. My deepest gratitude to the board members of the Oil and Gas, Natural
Resources, and Energy Journal for their guidance throughout the process of crafting this
note.
1. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524-25 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Corfield v. Croyell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
2. Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the SoCalled “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1279 (2002).
3. See id. at 1278-87.
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conflict and litigation, particularly when a government action or regulation
prevents an owner of real property from using his property in the manner he
so desires. For example, a landowner’s interest in building a house in the
shape of a pyramid might conflict with the local government’s interest in
safeguarding property values in the neighborhood.4 Such competing
interests most commonly manifest themselves in the context of zoning and
land-use regulations.
Despite property ownership being theoretically fundamental, the
practical protections of this right have proven to be thin. When a zoning or
land-use regulation is enacted that dictates what property owners can and
cannot do with their property, courts have accorded substantial deference to
such zoning and regulatory decisions. As such, landowners have continued
to seek to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. However,
due to the wide deference courts have chosen to bestow on state and local
governments, landowners continue to find certain rights associated with
property all but taken.
This note will first examine the law surrounding the takings clause as it
existed prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin.5 After
summarizing the case and recounting the Court’s decision, this note will
analyze the Court’s opinion and explain how the Court’s addition to takings
jurisprudence was necessary. This note will then discuss why the particular
method chosen nevertheless failed due to the Court’s circular application of
its new-found test to the issue presented.
II. The Law Before the Case
The Fifth Amendment encompasses various rights, which most
commonly include the right against self-incrimination and the right against
“double jeopardy.”6 The so-called “takings” clause also finds its home in
the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment, along with the other first ten
amendments, originally applied only to the federal government. However,
almost all of them, including the Fifth Amendment, have since been held to
also apply to state governments through the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7

4. See State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
5. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) [hereinafter
Penn Central].
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The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no “private
property shall be taken for public use, without just compensation.”8 The
extent of this protection has stirred up much litigation and debate. When a
property owner asserts a takings claim, the following issues commonly
arise: 1) whether the government’s purported use constitutes a “public
use”;9 whether the government has paid “just” compensation;10 3) whether
the property has in fact been “taken” within the meaning of the
Constitution; and 4) issues regarding the relevant property at issue.11 The
manner in which the Court resolves these issues depends on whether the
property owner alleges a categorical taking or a regulatory taking.
A. Categorical Takings
Categorical takings overtly fall within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment’s takings clause. These are also referred to as per se takings.
Such takings relevant for the purposes of this note consist of permanent
physical fixtures12 and regulations that effectively deprive an owner of “all
economically beneficial use[]” of his or her land.13 For example, the Court
held in Lucas that where a regulation enacted in 1988 prevented a
landowner from building permanent residential structures on two residential
lots he had purchased two years before the regulation’s enactment,14 and
where the trial court found that the property “had been rendered valueless
as a result,”15 a taking had occurred requiring just compensation.16
Therefore, under a categorical takings analysis, if the governmental action
amounts to a physical occupation on private property or if it effectively
eliminates all economic use of the property, such action is held to be a
taking for which the government must compensate the owner.17

8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
10. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
11. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (failing to reach the issue
because the landowner did not raise it in the petition for certiorari); see also Penn Central,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1982).
13. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S 1003, 1019 (1992).
14. Id. at 1003.
15. Id. at 1020.
16. Id. at 1019.
17. See id.; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
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B. Regulatory Takings
Initially, the takings clause was thought to extend only to physical
takings.18 However, the Court later established that a taking can be
effectuated in ways that do not necessarily involve physical occupancy.19
Specifically, land use and zoning regulations, though typically viewed as
permissible exercises of police power, can also run afoul of the Fifth
Amendment’s takings clause.20 The Court held in Pennsylvania Coal that
“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if [the] regulation goes
too far[,] it will be recognized as a taking,”21 otherwise known as a
regulatory taking. The challenged regulation in Pennsylvania Coal
accomplished just that.22
In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company conveyed surface rights to a piece
of property, but it expressly retained the right to mine coal under the
property.23 The grantees further waived all claims for damages that might
have arisen from the mining.24 Decades later, the state passed an Act that
prohibited mining coal in such a way that would “cause the subsidence
of . . . any structure used as a human habitation.”25 The company’s mining
activity had such effect, and the grantees sought to enjoin the mining on the
grounds that the mining violated the Act.26 However, the Court found that
the Act effectively destroyed the company’s property and the contractual
rights it expressly reserved.27 Therefore, the Court held that applying the
Act to the case at hand amounted to a taking.28
After this revelation, a taking may present itself in three ways: 1)
permanent physical occupancy;29 2) a regulation depriving a landowner of
all economically beneficial use of his or her property;30 and 3) takings of
personal property.31

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Coal].
See id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425-26.
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Nevertheless, even if a regulation has not deprived the landowner of all
economically beneficial use of his or her property, all is not lost for the
owner. Beyond categorical takings, determining whether one’s property has
been taken under the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is not a simple
task.32 The Court has laid down a set of factors to consider when
determining whether a regulatory action nevertheless constitutes a taking.33
In Penn Central, New York City enacted a Landmark Preservation Law
which required prior approval before making alterations to property that
had been designated as a landmark.34 The Grand Central Terminal had been
so designated.35 Several months after its designation, owners of the
Terminal entered into an agreement with a development company whereby
the company would construct an office building above the Terminal.36 Due
to the Terminal’s landmark designation, the owners and the company
sought approval of two construction plans; the Commission denied both
plans.37 The owners subsequently sued, claiming a Fifth Amendment
takings violation and sought, inter alia, injunctive relief.38
There, the Court had to determine “whether the application of New York
City’s Landmark Preservation Law to the parcel of land occupied by the
Grand Central Terminal ha[d] ‘taken’ the owner’s property.”39 To
determine whether the preservation law effectuated a taking, the Court
introduced three factors. The Court considered: 1) “the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant”; 2) “the extent to which the regulation . . .
interfere[d] with investment-backed expectations”; and, 3) “the character of
the governmental action.”40 As to the “character” analysis, the Court
determined whether the “interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by the government” or simply as interference that
“arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.”41 These factors make up the
test courts apply when presented with a regulatory takings claim. Therefore,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 124.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1482

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

if a state action does not amount to a per se taking, the case will be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the test set forth in Penn Central.
Notwithstanding its developments, takings jurisprudence prior to Murr v.
Wisconsin was not sufficient to guide the resolution of the underlying issue
presented therein.42 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Murr dissent, the
two methods of inquiry for regulatory takings “presuppose[d] that the
relevant ‘private property’ [had] already been identified.”43 Therefore, Murr
presented an opportunity for a long-overdue resolution to what has become
a dispositive preliminary issue.
III. Statement of the Case
A. The Burdensome Regulations
The land at issue in Murr is located along the Lower St. Croix River in
Troy, Wisconsin.44 Due to its aesthetic and tourism value, the St. Croix
River had been designated for federal protection in 1972.45 In an effort to
comply with the federal designation, Wisconsin enacted several regulations
regulating land use and development in the area surrounding the River.46
Pursuant to these regulations, lots could not be treated as separate building
sites unless “the lot [wa]s in separate ownership” or “the lot by itself or in
combination with an adjacent lot . . . [was] under common ownership . . .
[and] ha[d] at least one acre of [buildable land] area.”47 However, the
regulations included an exception for presently existing substandard lots,
known as a grandfather clause, which made an exception for “substandard
lots” that were not under common ownership.48 In addition to the minimum
“project area” requirement, a provision which operated as a merger
provision applied to adjacent lots under common ownership; it provided
that such lots could neither be sold nor developed if they did not meet the
size requirement for developable land.49 Owners of substandard lots could
apply for variances through the local zoning board upon proof of
“unnecessary hardship.”50
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017).
Id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1940.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118.08).
Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118.08(4)(a)(1)).
Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118(4)(a)(2)).
Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118.09(4)(b)).
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B. The Facts
The land at issue in Murr consisted of two adjacent lots, known as Lot E
and Lot F, located along the St. Croix River.51 The lots are described as
follows:
The lots have the same topography. A steep bluff cuts through
the middle of each, with level land suitable for development
above the bluff and next to the water below it. The line dividing
Lot E from Lot F runs from the riverfront to the far end of the
property, crossing the blufftop along the way. Lot E has
approximately 60 feet of river frontage, and Lot F has
approximately 100 feet. Though each lot is approximately 1.25
acres in size, because of the waterline and the steep bank[,] they
each have less than one acre of land suitable for development.
Even when combined, the lots' buildable land area is only 0.98
acres due to the steep terrain.52
The petitioners’ parents previously owned both lots and had held the lots
under separate ownership.53 The family plumbing company held title to Lot
F, and the parents held title to Lot E in their names.54 A recreational cabin
existed on Lot F,55 and Lot E remained vacant.56 The Murr siblings—two
sisters and two brothers—later obtained title to the two lots from their
parents, receiving title to Lot F in 1994 and title to Lot E in 1995.57 Upon
obtaining title to Lot E, the adjacent lots came under common ownership.58
Due to the substandard nature of each lot, this triggered the so-called
“merger” provision which effectively merged both lots and purported to
treat them as a single parcel.59
As time passed, the siblings wanted to move the cabin on Lot F to a
different portion of the lot,60 so they decided to sell “Lot E to fund the

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1941.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 4, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017)
(No. 15-214), 2016 WL 1459199, at *4.
57. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
58. Id. at 1940-41.
59. Id. at 1941.
60. Id.
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project.”61 They sought variances from the St. Croix County Board of
Adjustment, including a variance to allow the separate sale or use of the
lots, but the Board denied their requests.62
C. Procedural History
Frustrated with their inability to proceed with their improvement plan,
the petitioners sued, claiming the regulations amounted to a regulatory
taking of Lot E.63 They argued that the regulations “depriv[ed] them of all,
or practically all, of the use of Lot E because [it] cannot be [separately] sold
or developed.”64 The circuit court found that no taking occurred, reasoning
that, notwithstanding the regulations, the “petitioners retained ‘several
available options for the use and enjoyment of their property’” and the
property’s value was not sufficiently diminished to amount to a taking. 65
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the property as a
whole consisted of both Lots E and F together,66 because the zoning laws
were already in effect when they acquired the property, the petitioners did
not have a reasonable expectation to use the lots separately,67 and, agreeing
with the circuit court, “the regulations diminished the property’s combined
value by less than ten percent.”68
D. Issue Presented
This case presented the issue of whether, under the parcel as a whole
rule, Lots E and F together or Lot E alone was the relevant “property” to be
considered in determining whether a taking occurred.69
IV. Decision
A. Majority: The Whole Lot of It
To resolve the issue before it, the Court made two inquiries: 1) what is
the private property at issue; and 2) has the property been “taken” so as to
require just compensation?70 The Court began its analysis by
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1941-42.
Id. at 1942.
Id. at 1943-44.
Id.
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acknowledging that the resolution of the question presented “may be
outcome determinative.”71 Realizing that there are no specific guidelines to
identify the relevant parcel, the Court reflected on prior decisions and noted
two useful concepts on which it has previously relied in guiding its
decisions.72
First, the Court noted that it does not “limit the parcel . . . to the portion
of property targeted by the challenged regulation,” referencing its decisions
in Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra.73 This concept has evolved into the
“parcel as a whole” rule.74 The second concept is the Court’s continued
caution against “the view that property rights under the takings clause
should be coextensive with those under state law.”75 Per this concept, the
Court recognized the danger in allowing state law to define completely
one’s property rights as they exist under the takings clause—particularly in
ways that would yield results detrimental to an owner’s investment-backed
expectations, which the takings clause has been held to protect.76
Noting that “no single consideration can supply the exclusive test for
determining the denominator,” and paring this reality with a couple of
familiar concepts, the Court introduced three new factors to help determine
the denominator.77 Those factors are: 1) the treatment of the land under
state and local law; 2) the physical characteristics of the land; and 3) the
prospective value of the regulated land.78 According to the Court, the
ultimate goal of this inquiry is to determine “whether reasonable
expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to
anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or . . . as
separate tracts.”79
For the first factor, the Court directed that the treatment of the land under
state and local law be given “substantial weight” with particular attention to
“how it is bounded or divided.”80 Under the same inquiry, the Court further
71. Id. at 1944.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 331 (2002); Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 130).
74. Id. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“We rejected that narrow definition of
‘property’ at issue, concluding that the correct unit of analysis was the owner’s ‘rights in the
parcel as a whole.’”) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31).
75. Id. at 1944.
76. Id. at 1952.
77. Id. at 1945.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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imputes some knowledge to a prospective landowner of the restrictions and
regulations affecting his or her subsequent use of the property.81
Applying this factor, the Court quickly dismissed the solutions to
determining the denominator proposed by both the State and the
petitioners.82 It then determined that this factor supported the property being
treated as one parcel because state law merged Lots E and F, the merger
provision was valid, and the petitioners voluntarily subjected themselves to
the merger provision by bringing the lots under common ownership.83
Guiding the second factor, the Court identified the relevant
characteristics of the land to include “the physical relationship of any
distinguishable tracts, the parcel’s topography, the surrounding human and
ecological environment[, and whether] the property is located in an area . . .
subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other
regulation.”84 Here, the Court also determined that treating the lots as a
single parcel was appropriate.85 The Court specifically pointed out that the
lots’ rough terrain and narrow shape and the land’s location along the St.
Croix River made it reasonable for Petitioners to “expect their range of
potential uses to be limited” and to “anticipate[] regulations affecting the
enjoyment of their property, as the [area] was . . . regulated . . . under state,
federal, and local law long before Petitioners possessed the land.”86
When applying the third, final factor, courts must “assess the value of the
property under the challenged regulation, [while paying] special attention to
the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.”87 Here, the
Court determined the “prospective value Lot E [brought] to Lot F
support[ed] considering the two as one parcel,”88 and the benefits of using
both lots as a whole mitigated the prohibition on selling Lot E.89
Additionally, if the Murrs sold the lots together, the value of the combined
lots would be $698,300 whereas, if sold individually, Lot F’s value would
be $373,000 and Lot E’s value would be $40,00090—a difference of over
$285,000. After applying each factor, the Court determined that the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 1946-47.
Id. at 1948.
Id. at 1945-46 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1948.
Id.
Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1948.
Id.
Id. at 1949.
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appropriate denominator for a regulatory takings claim was Lots E and F
together as a single parcel.91
After establishing the denominator, the Court then analyzed whether a
regulatory taking had occurred. The Court first found that the Murrs had not
been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the property under
Lucas because “[t]hey [could still] use the property for residential
purposes.”92 The Court then examined the Murrs’ takings claim under the
Penn Central test. Pointing to the appraisal values, the Court determined
that the economic impact of the regulation was not severe.93 Furthermore,
the fact that the regulation existed prior to their acquisition of both lots
negated any claim that they reasonably expected to use the lots separately.94
Finally, the Court determined that “the governmental action was a
reasonable land-use regulation [in an] effort to preserve the river and
surrounding land.”95 After applying the various tests and factors, the Court
held that a compensable taking had not occurred.96
B. Dissent
Three justices refused to join the majority’s reasoning.97 The dissent
opined that by introducing “an elaborate test” to define the property at
issue, the majority departed from its longstanding tradition of looking to
state law to define such property.98 The dissent further asserted that, when
determining the denominator, the majority considered criteria that “should
[actually] be considered when deciding if a regulation constitutes a
‘taking.’”99 In doing so, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against takings
and its effectiveness as a check on the government is undermined.100
Because the denominator is chosen based on reasonableness, state
governments now have an incentive to seek aggregation of legally distinct
property in the context of litigation.101 The state will now have two bites at
the constitutional apple when a court makes a takings inquiry.102
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1948.
Id. at 1949.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1948-50.
Id. at 1949.
Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1954.
Id.
See id. at 1954-55.
See id. at 1955.
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V. Analysis
The threshold issue presented in Murr by no means came as a surprise to
the Court; this “denominator” issue has manifested itself to the Court in the
past.103 Until now, the Court has been able to avoid it. However, through
Murr, the issue was resurrected and the Court finally made an attempt to
resolve it. In doing so, the Court introduced something necessary but used it
in a manner that was harmful to one of the few meaningful roots in which
property guarantees are grounded.
A. The Necessary End
A method to aid the determination of the relevant parcel at issue was
long overdue. The Court has previously cautioned against relying on state
law alone to define property rights under the takings clause.104 However,
beyond this, no meaningful guidance had been offered. Therefore, the
Court’s decision to enumerate precise considerations to weigh alongside
state law was nothing short of necessary to avoid arbitrary inquiries into
defining the relevant parcel and to ultimately avoid misguided applications
of takings jurisprudence when the relevant parcel is in dispute.
However, in his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts interpreted the majority’s
test as a deviation from the Court’s long-standing tradition of defining the
property according to state law.105 Under his reasoning, he would have the
Court look only to state law to define the property at issue.106 However,
such limitation is not a sound solution to resolving disputes regarding state
laws which purport to redefine property boundaries. Furthermore, such
strict and exclusive reliance would open the door to uncontrolled regulatory
action which would threaten to reduce fundamental property rights to a
mere theory. As the majority noted, merger provisions that would be
completely unreasonable can exist.107 The Court used the example of a
regulation purporting to consolidate nonadjacent property under common
ownership.108 Thus, if the Court strictly limited itself to defining property
based on state law alone, it would find itself upholding absurd regulatory
provisions purporting to bind remote tracts of land. Furthermore, the
dissent’s confidence that any “gamesmanship” or “obvious attempts to alter
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
See id.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 1945.
Id.
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the legal landscape in anticipation of a lawsuit [would not] be difficult
to . . . disarm”109 is void of a non-arbitrary explanation of how the Court
would do so. Nevertheless, though the Court heeded such a necessary call,
it did so in a way that resulted in more harm than good.
B. The Evil Means
On its face, the Court’s first factor seems harmless. Including the state’s
treatment of certain property when determining the denominator is the
logical thing to do considering that property—the group of rights one has in
relation to a certain thing,110 is a matter of state law. Furthermore, even the
dissent acknowledged that the Court traditionally looks to state law to
define the boundaries of parcels of land,111 which makes such consideration
consistent with precedent.
However, the extent to which the Court relied on state law to identify the
denominator was circular. It assumed the question for which an answer was
sought and bypassed the inquiry that needed to be made, which was
whether the challenged state regulation resulted in a taking of the Murrs’
property.112 Though the laws currently in place at the time the owner
acquires the property may provide some insight into the reasonableness of a
landowner’s anticipated uses of his property, such deferential reliance on
those laws assumes that they are both reasonable and presently in accord
with the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, when that law is attacked for running
afoul of the Fifth Amendment, it is circular, then, to allow this one-third of
the overall inquiry to be so substantially determinate of the ultimate
outcome.
When the regulation purporting to define the property at issue is the very
regulation being challenged, other indicia of state law should be lent more
weight than that which was accorded by the Court. Specifically, traditional
references to state law defining parcels by the metes and bounds, the legal
distinctions of the land, whether the owner paid taxes on each parcel
individually or collectively, and the length of time between acquisition of
the first and second parcels, just to name a few. These things are also
capable of speaking to an owner’s reasonable expectations regarding
whether his property will be treated as separate tracts or a single parcel.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1951 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1941.
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Additionally, the manner in which the owner treats the property
immediately after and during possession—whether he himself treated them
as separate or as single parcels—is another insightful indicator of the
owner’s expectations regarding his property. Here, the Murrs’ parents first
purchased Lot F and later purchased Lot E, which remained undeveloped,
and they held Lot E for investment purposes until they could decide what to
do with it.113 They then passed this same expectation to their children who
held on to Lot E for another decade before deciding to make good on the
investment and seeking to sell it for the benefit of Lot F.114 Rather than
crediting this as an expectation of using the lots separately, the Court
deemed these facts as mere evidence of knowledge of the regulations and,
thus, an unreasonable expectation of using the lots separately,115 never mind
how the owners objectively manifested their expectation.
Furthermore, the manner in which the Court applied the second factor
was, again, harmful to landowners and helpful to states. The Court decided
that physical characteristics of property can put an owner of adjacent
parcels on notice that his property might be subject to regulation, and that
his use or enjoyment of the land might be in some way limited.116 Under the
Court’s reasoning, the fact that some regulation might apply to property in a
certain area is somehow sufficient to plant in an owner’s mind that,
specifically, his two properties will be treated as one; thus, the anticipation
of regulation in general equates an expectation of a specific type of
regulation. Not only is such conclusion far-reaching, but it is also
inconsistent with the regulations in place affecting the property at issue in
Murr. The regulations expressly allowed an owner of a substandard lot in
the regulated area to nevertheless develop or sell it despite the physical
characteristics of the land.117
Furthermore, when setting out to define the relevant property,
considering the prospective value of the regulated property is destined to
yield unfair results for a landowner similarly situated to the Murr siblings.
The Court credited the enhanced value of both lots together as evidence of
the reasonableness of considering both parcels as one lot. However, relying
on such a “two-is-better-than-one” result might be a reasonable decision if
one’s goal was economic gain, but it does not equate a reasonable
113. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 3, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017)
(No. 15-214), 2016 WL 1459199, at *3.
114. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
115. See id. at 1948.
116. See id.
117. See Wis. Admin. Code NR §§ 118.08(4)(a)(1); 118.09(4)(b).
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expectation that two adjacent lots under common ownership would be
treated as one, especially if a property owner uses the two lots for separate
purposes. Conversely, simply because two parcels would be worth more or
retain approximately the same value if they were treated as a single parcel
does not make an owner’s expectation of maintaining separate uses of the
lots unreasonable. To hold as such places a property owner’s “destiny”
regarding his property into the hands of the government, a gesture which, as
the Court noted, the government would be eager to accept.118 Furthermore,
as the dissent noted, examining any impact on property’s value comes into
play when determining whether there has been a taking;119 this inquiry
arises only after the relevant property has been identified.120 Inviting value
in the equation twice steepens the slope of the already uphill battle that
petitioners seeking to bring a takings claim must face.
C. Where Do We Draw the Line?
The precise test chosen for determining the relevant parcel blurs the line
between a denominator inquiry and a takings analysis. In fact, there can be
no line between the two. As Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent noted, the Court
effectively applied a takings analysis to define the relevant property at
issue.121 For example, the test’s third factor—the prospective value of the
land—not only borrows from takings jurisprudence, but it effectively
determines the outcome of the first factor in takings analysis—the
economic impact of the regulation—before the Court has even undergone
the inquiry. If the Court determines that the prospective value of the
regulated land weighs in favor of assigning the broader definition to the
relevant parcel, then the logical effect of that outcome carries over to
takings analysis. Otherwise, a court could find that the prospective value of
the land supports a reasonable expectation for two distinct parcels being
treated as one, but yet determine that the economic impact regarding the
same property is so detrimental to the owner’s reasonable property
expectations that it amounts to a taking and requires just compensation. One
cannot conceive such an unsound result.
In addition to the similar purposes for which the Court examines value
and economic impact, the line is further blurred by the overall goals in
conducting each analysis. Each inquiry seeks to ascertain what an owner
118.
119.
120.
121.

Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943.
Cf. id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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reasonably expected to get out of the property and whether applying the
challenged regulation to the owner undermines his property expectation.122
The overlap is further evidenced in the Court’s brief analysis into whether a
taking had occurred.123 After applying its new-found test, the Court simply
imported its findings from determining the relevant parcel. In just four
sentences, the Court held that the Murrs had not suffered a taking for the
same reason that the lots in question should be treated as one.124
VI. Conclusion
Through its decision in Murr, the Court employed evil means to reach a
necessary end and thereby made it nearly impossible to draw the line
between solving a denominator issue and resolving a takings claim. Sound
guidance was necessary to answer a both simple and difficult question.
However, the manner in which the Court applied its denominator test
accomplished the very thing the Court purported to reject. Though the
Court expressly rejected solving the denominator issue based on state law
alone, its test functionally does just that. Additionally, the second and third
factors were applied in such a way to ascertain whether the state’s position
regarding the denominator is justified, which makes these factors in
addition to state law merely illusory.
The deck remains stacked against the landowner, with each aspect of his
claim being viewed in the light most favorable to the government, not once,
but twice. Under the Court’s new test, a victory of the battle effectively
guarantees a victory of the war, and the Murr decision rigs each battle in
such a way that continues to favor states. The Court continues to
demonstrate that the constitutional assurance in the Fifth Amendment that
private property will not be taken without compensation is nothing more
than a thin, last resort guarantee. With each new or first impression issue,
courts will continue to be deferential to states when citizens’ property rights
are at stake, requiring states to satisfy only a reasonableness standard for
invading a fundamental right. Takings jurisprudence as a whole has now
become a blur and will remain as such until the Court takes back its failed
attempt to put the denominator issue to rest.

122. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945-46; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S at 124-25.
123. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
124. Id.
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